

CONCLUSION

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Parks' motion to transfer, because the juvenile court does not have jurisdiction over a person who has reached the age of majority. The mere fact that Parks was a juvenile at the time of the offenses does not automatically give him the right to be tried as a juvenile. Furthermore, because Parks pled no contest to a registrable offense under SORA, the plain language of the statute requires Parks to register as a sex offender.

AFFIRMED.

STATE OF NEBRASKA EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DISCIPLINE OF
THE NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT, RELATOR, V.

JEREMY R. SHIRK, ALSO KNOWN AS JEREMY
MUCKEY-SHIRK, RESPONDENT.

803 N.W.2d 518

Filed September 30, 2011. No. S-11-319.

Original action. Judgment of public reprimand.

HEAVICAN, C.J., WRIGHT, CONNOLLY, GERRARD, STEPHAN,
McCORMACK, and MILLER-LERMAN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

INTRODUCTION

Respondent, Jeremy R. Shirk, also known as Jeremy Muckey-Shirk, was admitted to the practice of law in the State of Nebraska on June 16, 2010, and in the State of Iowa on September 25, 2009. At all times relevant hereto, respondent was engaged in the private practice of law in Douglas County in Omaha, Nebraska. On April 19, 2011, formal charges were filed against respondent. The formal charges set forth one count and included the charge that respondent violated Neb. Ct. R. of Prof. Cond. § 3-508.4(a) through (d) (misconduct). The formal charges also allege respondent violated his oath of office as an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Nebraska, as provided by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 7-104 (Reissue

2007), by violating Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-915.01 (Reissue 2008) and 64-105 (Reissue 2009).

Respondent filed an answer to the formal charges on May 19, 2011. A referee was appointed on June 9, and on June 17, the referee filed a notice of scheduled hearing, set for July 20.

On July 18, 2011, respondent filed a conditional admission under Neb. Ct. R. § 3-313, in which he knowingly did not challenge or contest the truth of the allegations that he violated § 3-508.4(a) through (d) and waived all proceedings against him in connection therewith in exchange for a public reprimand. Upon due consideration, the court approves the conditional admission and orders that respondent be publicly reprimanded.

FACTS

In summary, the formal charges alleged as follows: In April 2008, respondent was hired by then-attorney Kim Erwin-Loncke during respondent's second year of law school to work as a law clerk in her firm. Respondent continued to work in that position through graduation, after which he became an associate in the firm. Respondent continued to work as an attorney for Erwin-Loncke through September 2010.

Beginning in January 2010, Erwin-Loncke began to work fewer hours in the office, apparently due to a severe disruption in her nonwork life. According to the allegations, Erwin-Loncke began to miss hearings and appointments. In May, Erwin-Loncke was hospitalized for a period of time as a result of stress.

Upon Erwin-Loncke's return to the office, the operations of the firm improved for approximately a week. Then, however, Erwin-Loncke again began to spend less time at work and less time supervising the office and employees, including respondent.

As the only other attorney in the office, respondent became responsible for more of the workload of the firm. Erwin-Loncke began directing respondent to sign pleadings in her name in her absence. She also authorized respondent to sign her name on checks. On at least two occasions, respondent not only signed Erwin-Loncke's name to a pleading, but then

also notarized that signature using his notary stamp. These documents were filed with the courts of Douglas County. Additionally, on July 23, 2010, allegedly with the permission of Erwin-Loncke, respondent wrote a check on the "Loncke Law Office IOLTA account," signing Erwin-Loncke's name and paying himself \$500.

ANALYSIS

Section 3-313 of the disciplinary rules provides in pertinent part:

(B) At any time after the Clerk has entered a Formal Charge against a Respondent on the docket of the Court, the Respondent may file with the Clerk a conditional admission of the Formal Charge in exchange for a stated form of consent judgment of discipline as to all or part of the Formal Charge pending against him or her as determined to be appropriate by the Counsel for Discipline or any member appointed to prosecute on behalf of the Counsel for Discipline; such conditional admission is subject to approval by the Court. The conditional admission shall include a written statement that the Respondent knowingly admits or knowingly does not challenge or contest the truth of the matter or matters conditionally admitted and waives all proceedings against him or her in connection therewith. If a tendered conditional admission is not finally approved as above provided, it may not be used as evidence against the Respondent in any way.

Pursuant to § 3-313, we find that respondent knowingly did not challenge or contest the truth of the essential relevant facts outlined in the formal charges and knowingly admits that he violated § 3-508.4(a) through (d). We further find that respondent waives all proceedings against him in connection herewith. Upon due consideration, and in view of respondent's relative inexperience at the time of his misconduct, the court approves the conditional admission and enters the orders as indicated below.

CONCLUSION

Based on the conditional admission of respondent, the recommendation of the Counsel for Discipline, and our independent

review of the record, we find by clear and convincing evidence that respondent has violated § 3-508.4(a) through (d) and his oath as an attorney, § 7-104, and that respondent should be and hereby is publicly reprimanded. Respondent is directed to pay costs and expenses in accordance with Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 7-114 and 7-115 (Reissue 2007) and Neb. Ct. R. §§ 3-310(P) and 3-323(B) within 60 days after an order imposing costs and expenses, if any, is entered by the court.

JUDGMENT OF PUBLIC REPRIMAND.